Introduction
Decision aids appear necessary to overcome the systematic errors to which people are prone in uncertainty reasoning but the availability of automated tools has not led to significant reliance on normative techniques of reasoning.
In fact automating normative processes seems to be detrimental to their introduction in many applications. Acceptance problems may stem from the translation between mental models of a decision situation to a formal model and back from the implications of the formal model to terms users can understand.
Because rule-based expert systems are decision aids based on descriptive models of human problem solving behavior, the assumption is often made that a recapitulation of program actions paraphrased in natural language will au tomatically be understandable to users. When rule-based inference was ex tended in MYCIN and Prospector to account for uncertainty, the typical rule backchaining technique of explanation was extended in a straight-forward manner. Here is a MYCIN rule as it would be printed in an explanation: IF: (1) (2) (3) (4) THEN:
The identity of the organism is not known with certainty, and The stain of the organism is gramneg, and The morphology of the organism is rod, and The aerobicity of the organism is aerobic There is strongly suggestive evidence (.8) that the class of the organism is enterobacteriaceae.
But the explanation facilities of most expert systems do not explain the updat ing of certainty that results from a rule executing.
There recently have been efforts to develop explanation facilities for deci sion support systems which employ normative methods (Spiegelhalter, 1985; Reggia and Perricone, 1985; Politser, 1984; Norton, 1986; Langlotz, Shortliffe, and Fagan, 1986) . However, none of the approaches is based on an explicit model of cognition that accounts for the dissonance that occurs when user's compare normatively calculated probability with an internally generated es timate. In fact, the general belief in the AI community is that representation of uncertainty based on probability is not explainable:
It is difficult to imagine what explanation of its actions the program [based on Bayes' rule] could give if it were queried about computed probabilities. No matter what level of detail is chosen, such a program's actions are not (nor were they intended to be) a model of the reasoning process typically employed by physicians. Although they may be an effective way for the computer to solve diagnosis problems, there is no easy way to interpret these actions in terms that will make them comprehensible to humans unacquainted with the program. (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1982) The current approach to building understandable AI systems that reason with uncertainty is to develop uncertainty mechanisms that are descri ptive of human reasoning, eschewing normative probability. While advocates claim these alternative calculi address the problem of cognitive dissonance, the tendency to deviate from normative rules is unacceptable for many ap plications.
In any case, claims that these alternatives are descriptive of human reasoning have not been verified.
Understanding and Explanation of Bayesian Inference
The explanation technique described herein is based on the theory that Bayesian inference is, in fact, descri ptive of some human reasoning. A process model of uncertainty reasoning is proposed that (1) accounts for the systematic biases that people exhibit in assessing probability due to neglect of prior probabilities (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982) , (2) includes procedures that are consistent with Bayes' rule, and (3) accounts for the selection of one set of procedures over the other. l
Heuristics and Biases
The heuristics of representativeness, availability, and anchoring and ad justment are procedures that account for errors in assessing probabilities due to neglect of base rates . Consider a screening test known to detect the presence of drugs in 90% of users tested. An error due to neglect of base rates would be the inference that the probability of drug use by a person who tests positive is 0.9; i.e., the sensitivity of the test is mistaken for the posterior probability.
This behavior is accounted for in my process model by a production which produces the heuristic that people who test posi tively are re presentative of people the test was designed to detect:
IF a ?class has ?feature with probability ?p and ?individual has ?featu re THEN ?individual is a ?class with probability ?p When ?c lass, ?feature, ?p, and ?individual are instantiated with elements in working memory, the resulting inference would be:
IF a dru g user has positive test with probability 0.9 and Joe Employee has positive test THEN Joe Employee is a dru g user with probability 0.9 2 1 I express the model in the ACT architecture of cognition (Anderson, 1983) . In ACT, productions in procedural memory are selected for processing based on information in internal Short Term Memory along with salient information in foveal vision. 2 Note that the MYCIN rule in the preceding section is essentially of the same form.
The (.8) in the rule is the certainty associated with the rule, not the resulting certainty of the hypothesis. Thus, such explanations will reinforce disregard of base rate information. Bayesian Th inking in Human s There is evidence suggesting that productions that account for prior prob ability are· part of people's procedural knowledge. For example, found that people use prior probabilities correctly when they have no other information but effectively ignore them when a description is introduced, even when the description is totally uninformative. Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1979) found that subjects become sensitive to prior probabilities and to the reliability of evidence when successive problems are encountered that differ only in these variables; biases appear when the con text of the problem has not been seen often enough to allow these salient fea tures to be recognized.
Including productions that account for these observations in a process model is not inconsistent with the existence of heuristics such as representa tiveness described above. A production that assigns posterior belief to be the prior probability is sufficient when only prior information is available. Pro cessing descriptive information could reduce the salience of prior informa tion, resulting in the representativeness heuristic being applied inappropriately . 1 But extending this process model with productions that properly ac count for prior probability requires the identification of some additional pro ductions that plausibly could be part of basic inductive knowledge. Such pro ductions are suggested by Polya's "shaded inductive patterns":
A implies B B almost certain anyway Btrue A very little more credible A implies B B without A hardly credible Bt rue A very much more credible Their intuitive appeal indicates these "productions" may be part of basic induc tive knowledge.
They seem consistent with the apparent relationship between surprise and modification of belief; unexpected observations revise the likeli hood of a hypotheses more than evidence consistent with current belief:
Perhaps the main biological function of surprise is to jar us into reconsidering the validity of some hypotheses ... To be surprised ... is to obtain a substantial Bayes factor (Good, in Shafer, 1982, p. 343) Importantly, Polya's patterns describe reasoning that can be modeled by Bayes' rule. For example, if "B almost certain anyway" is interpreted as the marginal P(B) (the divisor in Bayes' rule) being close to 1.0 and "A implies B" means P(B I A) is close to 1.0, then by Bayes rule the probability of A would be "very little more" than what it was prior to observing B. 2
The purpose of an explanation facility based on this model is to elicit the use of appropriate procedure's by the user. The critical factor is accounting for how alternative procedures are selected.
Linguistic Representation of Probability Most investigations of subjective inference have been concerned with the underlying procedures used to process information rather than with modes of 1 Salience of priors is largely under the control of a decision support system since, according to ACT, working memory includes elements in foveal vision. 2 Exactly how much more depends on the prior.
representation. But the representation of information in working memory can influence which problem solving procedures are selected (Simon, 1979) . If humans have a variety of computational procedures for reasoning under un certainty then improved performance in inference tasks should be observed when more suitable representations are used. Cohen and Grinberg (1983) suggest that numerical representations of un certainty detract from understanding and that human judgment may be better than it appears from numerically expressed estimates.
Linguistic expression of uncertainty might require a less complicated transformation for storage in short term memory, introducing less distortion than a numerical representation and resulting in better understanding (Freksa, 1982) . Zimmer (1983) found that subjects judged probabilities better when verbal modes were employed and Zimmer (1985) reports evidence that verbal processing of knowledge of uncertainty reduces biases of conservatism and negligence of regression. His results indicate that people are much closer to optimal Bayesian revision when they are allowed to use linguistic expressions of probability. Oden (1977) obtained similar results for conjunctive and disjunctive reasoning:
[probability rules] provide a substantially better fit to the data [than the rules of Possibility theory] for every (data) matrix and for the great majority of the subjects. (Oden, 1977) The observations that linguistic representation of uncertainty appear to improve reasoning support the conjecture that alternative processes for un certainty exist and that representation is a determining factor in which pro cesses are selected. It follows that stating explanations in linguistic form using relevant inference procedures will improve understanding.
An
Explanation Facility for Bayesian Inference
An explanation facility consisting of templates which produce linguis tic representations of Bayesian inference has been developed. The tem plates are based on the "shaded inductive patterns" of Polya (1954) and nat ural language term sets expressing probabilities and changes in probabili ties. The goal was to make the facility as domain independent as possible. This section describes some details . of a prototype implementation with em phasis on the psychological basis for implementation decisions. The first step was to choose a representative set of terms.
Lexicon of Probab ility ! For maximum explanatory power, translations from probabilities to natural language should convey as much information as possible but no more than the capability of the user to distinguish differences (to minimize cognitive load). The ability to distinguish meaningful differences in symbolic information is assumed to be governed by the capacity of Short Term Memory; about 5 sym bols (Simon, 1985) . Note that in linguistic form, probabilities tend to have a natural subdivision point; hypothesis of probability less than the subdivision point are referred to as "unlikely", hypothesis with probability greater than the subdivision point are "likely". Thus, granularity of the lexicon can be sub stantially decreased by assuming that "chunking" occurs at the subdividing point.
If the ability to easily distinguish levels of probability below and above the natural subdivision point are assumed to be governed by the hypothetical 1 It is clear that the lexicon of probabilities will be domain dependant and require calibration. for an effective lexicon of probability appears to be 11 (5 phrases on either side of a subdivi sion point term). Based on this analysis, the term set shown in Table 1 was adapted from Lichtenstein and Newman (1967) for use in the prototype. ! The lexicon selected to express the chan ge from prior to posterior probability is more important than the lexicon of probabilities because change in belief is what Bayesian conditioning models. In contrast to the lexicon of probability just discussed, there is no obvious "cognitive break point" in comparison terms. Thus, the practical upper limit on term set size should be the same as the assumed symbol capacity of short term memory (i.e., 5). However, two lists are required, one for decreasing likelihood (disconfirming evidence) and one for increasing likelihood (confirming evidence).
It remains an issue for further research to determine the best (most consistently used, etc.) set of terms. Table 2 shows the lists used in the prototype. A major issue still under investigation is the exact nature of the mapping from the cross product space of prior and posterior probabilities to phrases de scribing change in belief. Consider describing a change in probability from 1 Initial development assumed the range of probabilities to be [0,1] and the subdivision point to be 0.5. These assumptions are domain dependent. 2 The midpoints of term ranges should be equally spaced for language pragmatics when probabilities of interest are distributed over [0, 1] (Zimmer, 1985) .
Where probabilities tend to cluster at one end of the unit interval, some transformation appears to be necessary. The characteristics of that transformation are not addressed in this paper.
0.91 to 0.95 with a change from 0.01 to 0.05. One might say that 0.95 is "slightly more likely" than 0.91, but that 0.05 is "a great deal more likely" than 0.01, even though the absolute differences. are the same. Oden (1979) found that subjects were consistent in their comparison of relative belief, reporting experimental evidence supporting the following relation:
Rel(A, B) = Truth CA> Truth (A) + Truth (B) where Rel (A, B) is the relative truthfulness of statement A in relation to statement B and Truth(x) is a linguistic expression of belief in proposition x.
The prototype was implemented using this relation; its domain indepen dence remains an issue for further investigation.
Templates Polya's Patterns of Plausible Inference are the inspiration for English language sentences in which these words are embedded. The patterns can eas ily be rephrased into production-like sentence structures which experience in deductive expert systems has shown to be acceptable to users.
The marginal probability of evidence is the key used for selection of the templates. For example, a "small" marginal indicates that the evidence is unexpected or surprising. Because such a result strongly disconfirms prior belief, substantial belief revision is necessary. Conversely, a "large" marginal indicates evidence confirms prior belief; belief revision will be minimal.
With the marginal as selection criteria for templates, only three basic situations will be encountered corresponding to confirming evidence, disconfirming evidence, and a middle ground where prior belief accommo dates either result. When only a single point of reference is used in an ap plication, the probability at which observing evidence is neither "likely" nor "unlikely" occurs when the marginal is in a neighborhood of 0.5; a point which appears to be application and domain independent. In the prototype sentences were structured so that operational meaning is con veyed by words selected from term sets, making only two templates neces sary. In hindsight, a single template appears sufficient for this application. Figures 1 and 2 show examples generated by the facility. Explanation of effect of anticipated evidence. l Based only on its structure, it is not quite an even chance that P345-22 is a carcmogen.
Because a Positive Sister-Chromatid Exchanfj!e test is quite likely for a pyrrolizidine, the hypothesis that P345-22 is a carcinoflen is somewhat more likely, making it highly probable that P345-22 is a carcinoflen.
1 Italics indicates the words selected from the term sets previously discussed. Based · only on its structure, it is somewhat unlikely that P98-21 is a carcinogen.
There is a fair chance of a Negative L5178Y test for a benz-a anthracene, making it a bif less likely that P98-21 is a carcinogen. It is improbable that P98-21 is a carcinogen.
Acceptability
The preceding sections relate a theory of understanding that provide the basis for explanation of Bayesian conditioning. The usual AI technique for validating the acceptability of such a program is to demonstrate it for a target population of users.
The testimony of potential users is, of course, the weakest of acceptability tests, but is prudent before continuing devel opment.
To that end, a decision support application in which normative inference was a central issue to the system's acceptance was selected to prototype this explanation technique. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) risk analysis of new chemicals mandated by the Toxic Sub stances Control Act provided an appropriate domain.
A prototype decision support system for analysis of short-term mutagenicity test results was de signed. The purpose of the system is to determine the probability of car cinogenicity of a new chemical. Based on a chemical's structure, a prior probability is assigned. The program calculates the posterior probability of carcinogenicity based on test results and expert knowledge of the appli cability of the tests to various chemical classes. If requested by the user, the most definitive follow-up test is recommended.
Both the initial analy sis and the recommendation of the follow-up test are explained using the facility described herein.
An Agency consultant familiar with EPA decision makers cautioned that they would "never use" a Bayesian decision support system because they do not understand the probabilities (Clifford, 1985) . But based on interviews with EPA toxicologists, it appears the facility produces understandable and acceptable explanations of single step Bayesian conditioning.
Ef fective ness
Such a demonstration hardly constitutes validation of the model or sup ports the contention that Bayesian conditioning can be made understand able enough to remove it as an impediment to acceptability of normative decision support systems.
The central issue is whether decision makers "understand" output enough to act on the recommendations of the pro gram. This question is obviously difficult to test directly; it was necessary to construct an experiment that tested a side effect.
It is easy to demonstrate that subjects do not understand Bayesian condi tioning.
Present subjects with a scenario which includes information about prior probability (e.g., a population average) and some evidence that is con ditionally related to the target condition (e.g., an indicator which exhibits false negative and false positive rates) and most subjects will ignore the prior, mistaking the true positive rate to be the posterior probability.
When in formed of the normative posterior the subject will be confused how such a re sult could be correct; i.e., he will not "understand" it. If, in the (unannounced) presence of an explanation, a subject's answer is consistent with the normative posterior we might conclude he "understands" the in ference.
This is the essential outline of the experiment conducted to deter mine the effectiveness of the explanation facility.
Design Seven problems were presented in random order to each subject. The problems were duplicities of, or isomorphic to, inference problems from the "heuristics and biases" literature.
For each problem the subject selected one of five sub-intervals of the unit interval in which he thought the probability in question fell.
A between-groups design was used. A control group was giv en the original problems and the treatment group was given identical materi als with an explanation generated by the prototype facility.
Unlike a decision support system, there was no attention drawn to the explanation; it was simply included in the text immediately prior to the question concerning the proba bility.
Subjects Two groups of approximately 50 subjects each returned materials. The groups were randomly selected from a list of Members of the Technical Staff of the MITRE Corporation Washington Center. Follow-up questions indicated that the two groups were essentially the same in all relevant re spects (typical level of education, exposure to decision analysis concepts, etc.).
Results Replicating results from the literature, the maJonty of subjects in the control group neglected prior probability and chose the "biased" answer. As the histograms of subject responses in the figures below demonstrate, exposure to the explanation resulted in a discernable shift to the interval containing the normative solution.
While this experiment only indirectly addresses the central issues of this research, it does provide encouragement to continue development of both the model and the facility. 
Subject Response
This paper describes an explanation facility based on a cogmuve model which predicts that conditional reasoning can be manipulated to produce results described by normative rules of probability.
The maximum effec tive length of the lexicons of probability, the transformation from the cross product space of prior and posterior probability to the term set used to describe change in probability, and the basic sentence structures are sus pected to be domain-independent features of the explanation technique. Preliminary evidence indicates that the facility is both acceptable to po tential users and effective in overcoming the "haze of Bayes" (Polister, 1984) .
